

were a food store for the Germans and they could not exist without it. The analysis shows that only a minor party of the agricultural production of these districts reached Western Germany because of a rather low fertility of the soil and high costs of transport. Therefore it was more economical to meet the food shortage of Western Germany by overseas import. The steady outflow of population from the once Eastern Provinces and the decline of agriculture made this district a troublesome one, needing constant credits and subsidies. Analogically, the industrial production of the once German Silesia had but an irrelevant and steadily declining share in the production of Germany as a whole. As a result of German policy tending to control and subdue the countries of Middle-Eastern Europe Szczecin (Stettin) lost its importance, giving way to Hamburg. Generally Germany has lost about 23,4% of its territory but only about 10,8% of its national income. The importance of these territories was for Germany a purely political one as a base for the Prussian „Drang nach Osten”. The economic development of Western Germany after the II World War shows that the German fears about permanent food shortage were groundless. As soon as 1954 the pre-war living standard was reached there and there are quite real possibilities of its further increase. The present complaints of revisionists express only the tendency to attain food self-sufficiency which in the past enabled Germany to conquer Europe.

The problem of over-population in Western Germany has also been solved by the development of industry. At present there occurs rather a shortage of labour which combined with a poor demographic trend and a steady westward drive of Germans make the possibility of populating the Polish Western territories quite unreal, if the industry of Western Germany is not going to be threatened by a complete breakdown.

Within Polish boundaries the Western territories, in spite of many serious mistakes committed during the Six Years Plan, enabled to overcome the pre-war unsolvable problem of permanent over-population, to transform the economic structure of Poland by better utilizing the resources of whole Silesia. While the economic renewal in Poland is being carried out the potential role of these districts is enormous.

The new frontier line puts an end to the pre-war control of Germany over the countries of Middle-Eastern Europe by decreasing the great industrial preponderance of Germany in Europe which resulted in the conquest of the Continent. Thus the Odra-Nysa frontier becomes a real foundation for peaceful development of European countries.

JERZY KRASUSKI

ON THE NATURE OF „KULTURKAMPF“

The historiographical works on the genesis and history of Kulturkampf have been chiefly concerned with the analysis of the motives which induced Bismarck to undertake the struggle with the Catholic Church and the Catholic Conservative Party of the Centre. These studies have not resulted in an appropriate expression of the conflict between the liberal middle class on one side, and the conservative landowners, lower middle class and the clergy on the other. The Centre and the Catholic Church were the only conservative groups able to form a successful opposition against the liberal tendencies, owing to their clearly defined religious ideas and the support of a large majority throughout the nation. Bismarck's role in Kulturkampf is similar to that which he played in the unification of Germany. It consisted in the endeavour to meet the claims of the liberal middle classes, and at the same time

upholding the leading position of the Prussian Junkers. Nevertheless the liberal middle classes remained the driving force of this historical process. The name „Kulturkampf” originates from the left wing of Liberals. The legislative programme of Kulturkampf was an achievement of National Liberals (minister Falk). Falk's purpose was to establish the supremacy of the Bourgeois State over the school and Church and Centre resistance. By subduing the Catholic Conservatives he intended to create a Conservative block directed against the Liberals. He succeeded in carrying this out in the eighties. The attempts at approaching the Centre and the Church hierarchy appeared already at the very beginnings of Kulturkampf. They, however, failed as the Centre refused to support the Government together with the Liberals. The zeal which Bismarck displayed in leading Kulturkampf was the result of the paradoxical situation — at the same time he desired to approach the conservative camp and was obliged to follow the programme of Liberals supported by a majority, both in the nation and in the German Parliament.