

ZBIGNIEW KULAK

## RIBBENTROP — BONNET ENCOUNTER ON DECEMBER 6th 1938

The Author states that Germany intending to liquidate Czechoslovakia desired to gain the friendship of France. Germany could not, however, make the first step as this could arouse suspicions of its chief partner — Italy. That is why Germany created a friendly political atmosphere around France hoping that the formal proposal would come from her. This supposition was based on the knowledge of Auswärtiges Amt about the fears of isolation in French political circles exhibited after the signing of the Anglo-German Declaration. The German expectations were fulfilled when on October 13th 1938 for the first time François-Poncet proposed a Franco-German Declaration.

As to the problem whether Bonnet gave Germans "free hand" in the east or not, the Author underlines the fact that the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs considered the Paris encounter as a beginning of partition of influences in Europe expressed by French withdrawal from eastern Europe. Thus it is evident that the Germans were contemplating these matters before their talks with France. Whether the Germans were able to reach their aim and did Bonnet indeed express French désintéressement in the affairs of eastern Europe — this question cannot be answered as the available documents are not quite clear at this point.

The Author tries to give an answer based on the tendencies of French policy at that time and his supposition is that it is quite probable that Bonnet could have taken such an attitude.

ZDZISŁAW NOWAK

## ECONOMIC POLICY OF WESTERN GERMANY AND THE ECONOMIC SITUATION OF WESTERN EUROPE

In the first part of his work the Author discusses the economic policy of the German Reich at the time of economic depression following the crisis of 1929. He proves that the escape from this depression was attained by economic isolation, tendency to self-sufficiency and chiefly by the militarization of German industry, what enabled the Nazi aggression.

In order to make impossible the future German aggression, the Allies, already during the World War II decided to dismount the German military industry. This dismounting was, however, discontinued soon after the war. As a result of enormous investments prior to, and during the World War II, Western Germany started with a considerably higher productive capacity after the war than in 1936 in spite of the war damages and partial dismounting.

The post-war prosperity in the West of Europe and the abolishment of production limitations for Germany enabled a great economic expansion of Federal Germany, especially in export industry.

The idea of economic cooperation in Western Germany was based on the exchange of German industrial goods for „irrelevant products“ of other countries. This has made most European capitalist countries debtors of Western



Germany and the balance of trade of this country has had a steadily growing surplus. That and the policy of limiting import is closely linked, in Author's opinion, with some signs of economic recession which have been appearing at the end of 1956. The balance between productive and consumers goods can be easily disturbed in this situation. Among other means to stabilize the threatened economic balance of Western Germany the military preparations begin to play again a prominent role.

ANNA OWSIŃSKA

#### THE POLISH EMIGRATION AND THE GERMAN REVOLUTION OF 1832—1833

In the *Western Review*, No 11—12/56 the Authoress published an article entitled: „The Polish Problem and Liberal Germany in 1832—1833“ which was the first part of the article published in *The Western Review*, No 4/57, entitled: „The Polish Emigration and the Problem of German Revolution of 1832—1833“. In the first part the Authoress has described the attitude of the liberal German opinion towards the problem of the Polish Insurrection of November 1830, the way of accepting the Polish divisions in their march to France and their unsuccessful attempt of seizing control over Frankfurt a/Main with the approval of local Germans.

The second part of the work has been written by the Authoress after getting acquainted with the latest archival records. She presents the attitude of the aristocracy camp and of the most extreme left wing of the Polish Democratic Society (Polskie Towarzystwo Demokratyczne) towards the problem of Revolution in Germany. From periodical sources and other records from the Library of Czartoryski Museum in Cracov it appears that the group directed by Adam Czartoryski was opposed to the Revolution in Germany, while on the other hand, some representatives of the same camp considered the German problem as one that could have a great influence on Polish fate. This point of view was based on the sympathy of Paris and London and the possibility of peaceful emancipation of German states from the influence of St. Petersburg. The Emigration Press has greatly contributed to the characteristic of the opinion of the Polish Democratic Society in these matters. The article quotes several interesting letters of rev. Alexander Puławski, one of the founders of the Polish Democratic Society, and Dr. Wirth, a prominent leader of democrats in Southern Germany who won fame as the editor of a revolutionary paper „Deutsche Tribüne“. From these letters it appears that the cooperation of the Polish and German left wings became a quite real one as early as the first half of 1832.

Further the Authoress relates the attitude of the above mentioned emigration groups regarding the unsuccessful Revolution in Frankfurt a/Main. The letters of the members of the aristocracy camp show clearly that the first exaggerated news about the Revolution in Germany caused a great confusion. The representatives of this trend intended even, if the operation proved successful, to change somewhat their policy, to take part in German events and make use of them for their purpose.