

sembly of the United Nations on Dec 11, 1946. Owing to the Nuremberg trials, international legislation has proved successful in response to the challenge of crimes committed by Nazi aggressors during second world war.

LONGIN PASTUSIAK

MORGENTHAU'S PLAN

Considering matters broadly, the United States have been the scene of controversy, during second world war, between two concepts of American policy in respect to post-war Germany. One of the groups of American bourgeoisie embraced the notion of re-establishing a strong post-war Germany which was to be a potential American ally. Another group contemplated the idea of a greatest possible undermining of Germany aimed at its alimination as an economic competitor of the United States. Morgenthau's plan belongs to the latter scheme.

Morgenthau wrote: "My programme of liquidating the danger of German aggression is simple and consists in depriving this country of heavy industry". Among others, the plan provided for a division of Germany; for a sanctioning by the allies of every German government; for a separation from Germany of the Ruhr and Saar Basin; for a ban on industrial production on account of agricultural economy.

In September of 1944, at a session of the committee for German affairs established by president Roosevelt, Morgenthau submits his plan under discussion. Roosevelt sympathized with the state secretary's proposals. On September 12, 1944, he asked Morgenthau to come over to Quebec where there was taking place an encounter with Winston Churchill. Having received Morgenthau's detailed exposition, Roosevelt and Churchill approved of his plan.

After the Quebec success, adherents of Morgenthau's plan started to reason on its behalf before all the Washington commissions and organizations working out concepts of American postwar policy. At the same time opponents of this scheme did not abandon their enterprise. The Quebec conference having been ended, Cordell Hull and Henry Stimson lodged a protest to president Roosevelt and issued their own counter-proposals. Official circles of Washington soon assumed a negative attitude towards the state secretary and his followers, and soon after the adversaries waged their final campaign against Morgenthau's plan.

Under the influence of this group Roosevelt suspended, in autumn of 1944, the working out of plans of the future occupation policy in Germany. This decision of his proved that opponents of the state secretary's scheme had gained sufficient authority to prevent the preparatory steps towards introducing in Germany a post-war policy based on Morgenthau's plan; at the same time they had not yet the power to force through their own concept. Little by little, however, adherents of the so called clement conditions of German capitulation became more and more influential.

ZDZISŁAW NOWAK

STRUCTURAL CHANGES IN THE ECONOMIES OF WESTERN GERMANY

In the 1950's, West-German economy exhibited a topmost dynamic development. On the author's view the underlying causes of this progress were inherent in the economic structure of the German Federal Republic and in the alterations to which it had become subject. To clarify the matter, he divides the post-war era

into three periods: 1) 1948—1952, during which the political and economic revival took place; 2) 1952—1957 — the time of economic expansion; and 3) from 1958 onwards, when the elements of economic instability gained increasing significance.

Throughout the first period, Western Germany had become disengaged from a majority of economic bans imposed by the winning powers and had gained opportunities for utilizing its considerable economic wealth consisting in a largely broadened — in comparison with the pre-war period — industrial potential and abundant reserves of man power. These assets rendered possible the development of export based on competition which in turn became one of the chief incentives in the coming years. Increasing export effectuated within an atmosphere of a unifying policy of western Europe, and under conditions of an absence of any greater armament liabilities, was highly operative and created grounds for a dynamic development. Nevertheless, in time the favourable economic opportunities had become exhausted and led to structural changes in all the constituents of the former economic prosperity. Reserves of man power dwindled to a condition of shortage. Prices began to rise and to affect negatively the competitive value of German products on foreign markets; the rate of economic advancement subsided; and the balance of accounts became reduced.

Remedial means for counteracting these economic difficulties involved a further departure from the economic policy based on the doctrine of *Soziale Marktwirtschaft* on behalf of a concentration of economic and political agencies under competence of the state.

JERZY PERTEK

KRIEGSMARINE 1939—1945 IN WEST-GERMAN HISTORIOGRAPHY

The present article discusses the more important papers on the activities of *Kriegsmarine* in the years 1939—1945 which have been published so far in the German Federal Republic. Although there are no official publications of the ordnance type issued in several countries, West German historiography gives a fairly comprehensive portrayal of the role of *Kriegsmarine* in wartime and of its enterprises. This holds true as regards generalized synthetic publications such as strategic studies of admiral Assmann, a report on the proceedings of war by Ruge, histories written from personal knowledge of the war on sea by commanders-in-chief of the *Kriegsmarine*: admirals Raeder and Doenitz, issues on the different aspects of battles on the sea and different war theatres, biographies of the more eminent commanders or logbooks of prominent ships. In spite of the abundance of publications it is hardly possible to regard them as a reliable illustration of events. Authors of the publications in question are mostly former admirals, officers or war correspondents of the Nazi navy while the monographs usually represent an unchanged version of wartime issues. For this reason, to a lesser or higher degree, they are an expression of the notions and concepts held at time of the IIIrd Reich. In effect, although the reference literature affords knowledge on a profusion of events, its tendency to offer excuses and to glorify the wartime activities of *Kriegsmarine* and the careers of higher- and lower-rank officials and commanders compels to assume a greatly critical approach in drawing conclusions from this source.

The article traces out the revival of letters concerning war on sea in the German Federal Republic and deliberates upon — in a chronological succession — the hundred-odd issues on the activities of *Kriegsmarine* during the second world war. At the end of the article there is a list of reference works given in alphabetical order.¹